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Arthur S. Leonard, Lecture for Investiture as Robert F. Wagner Professor of Labor and
Employment Law, New York Law School, April 26, 2017
A Battle Over Statutory Interpretation:
Title VII and Claims of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination
I feel particularly honored to have my name associated with that of United States Senator Robert
F. Wagner, Sr., NYLS Class of 1900, a hero of the New Deal whose legislative leadership gave
us such important achievements as the National Labor Relations Act – commonly known among
labor law practitioners as the Wagner Act – and the Social Security Act -- laws that have shaped
our nation for generations. Senator Wagner was an immigrant who made an indelible mark on
the United States. I hope that in some small way I have made a contribution that makes this
named chair fitting.
I decided to select a topic for this talk that would bring together the two major areas of my
teaching and scholarship: labor and employment law, and sexuality law. These intersect in the
question whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which bans employment
discrimination against an individual because of his or her sex, will be open to claims by job
applicants and workers that they have suffered discrimination because of their sexual orientation
or gender identity. We are at a decisive point in the judicial battle over that question, having
achieved just weeks ago the breakthrough of our first affirmative appellate ruling on the sexual
orientation question, following several years of encouraging developments on the gender identity
question.
To understand the significance of this, we have to go back more than half a century, to the period
after World War II when the modern American gay rights movement began stirring with the
protests of recent military veterans against unequal benefits treatment, with the formation of
pioneering organizations like the Mattachine Society in Los Angeles and New York and The
Daughters of Bilitis in San Francisco, and with the vital behind-the-scenes work undertaken by
gay scholars as the great law reform effort of the Model Penal Code was being launched by the
American Law Institute. That postwar period of the late 1940s and 1950s played out alongside
the rise of the Civil Rights Movement, for which the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
a signal achievement.
The early gay rights advocacy groups had their lists of goals, and some kind of protection against
discrimination was prominent among them, but that task seemed monumental, at a time when
there was no federal statute prohibiting employment discrimination of any kind. Until Illinois
adopted the Model Penal Code in 1960, which effectively repealed criminal sanctions for private
consensual gay sex, it was a crime in every state; a serious felony with long prison sentences in
many. President Dwight Eisenhower issued an executive order shortly after taking office
banning the employment of “homosexuals” and “sexual perverts” in the federal civil service. A
major immigration law passed during the 1950s for the first time barred homosexuals from
immigrating to the U.S. and qualifying for citizenship by labeling us as being “afflicted by
psychopathic personality,” making us excludable on medical grounds. The military barred gay
people from serving on similar grounds, and many lines of work that required state licensing and
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determinations of moral fitness systematically excluded LGBT people. To be an ‘openly gay’
lawyer or doctor was virtually unthinkable in the 1950s and on into the 1960s.
When Congress was considering the landmark civil rights bill, first introduced during the
Kennedy Administration and shepherded into law by Lyndon Johnson, the idea that lesbians, gay
men, bisexuals and transgender people might seek or obtain assistance rather than condemnation
from Congress seemed a pipe dream. None of the legislators involved with the bill proposed
protecting members of these groups from discrimination. Title VII, the provision of the bill
dealing with employment discrimination, was limited in its original form to discrimination
because of race or color, religion, or national origin. A floor amendment, introduced by Howard
Smith of Virginia, a conservative Southern Democrat who was opposed to the bill, proposed to
add “sex” to the prohibited grounds for discrimination. The amendment carried, the bill passed,
and it went to the Senate where it was held up by one of the longest filibusters in history – at a
time when filibusters involved unbroken floor debate by the opponents of a pending measure,
with no vote on the merits until the Chamber was thoroughly exhausted and no opponent could
be found to continue speaking. The leadership of the Senate, trying to avoid having the bill
bottled up in committees headed by conservative senior Southern senators, had sent the bill
direct to the floor with a tight limit on amendments. Thus committee reports that would have
provided a source of legislative history on the meaning of “sex” in the bill are missing. The only
floor amendment relating to the addition of “sex” to Title VII was to clarify that pay practices
that were authorized under the Equal Pay Act, which had been passed the year before, would not
be held to violate Title VII. The statute contained no definition of “sex,” and in the early years
after its passage, the general view, held by the courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, was that the ban on sex discrimination simply prohibited employers from treating
women worse than men – with little agreement about what that meant. In fact, in an early
interpretive foray, the Supreme Court decided that Title VII did not prohibit discrimination
against women because they became pregnant. The resulting public outcry inspired Congress to
amend the statute to make clear that discrimination against a woman because of pregnancy or
childbirth was considered to be discrimination because of sex.
Early attempts by gay or transgender people to pursue discrimination claims under Title VII all
failed. The EEOC and the courts agreed that protecting people from discrimination because of
their sexual orientation or transgender status was not intended by Congress. They embraced a
literalistic “plain language” interpretation of Title VII, including a narrow biological
understanding of sex.
But something began to happen as the courts considered a wider variety of sex discrimination
claims. It became clear that a simplistic concept of sex would not be adequate to achieve the
goal of equality of opportunity in the workplace. Legal theorists had been advancing the concept
of a “hostile environment” as a form of discrimination, first focusing on the open hostility that
many white workers showed to black, Latino and Asian workers in newly-integrated workplaces.
During the 1970s the courts began to expand that concept to women who experienced hostility in
formerly all-male workplaces as well. Lower federal courts were divided about whether such
“atmospherics” of the workplace could be considered terms or conditions of employment when
they didn’t directly involve refusals to hire or differences in pay or work assignments. Finally
the Supreme Court broke that deadlock in 1986, holding in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson that
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a woman who experienced workplace hostility so severe that it could be said to affect her terms
and conditions of employment would have a sex discrimination claim under Title VII, and
subsequent cases clarified that the plaintiff did not have to show a tangible injury, although a
finding that working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would quit would
clearly meet the test of a hostile environment. Some courts began to extend this reasoning to
complaints by men, in situations where male co-workers subjected them to verbal and even
physical harassment.
The Court also began to grapple with the problem of sex stereotypes, and how easily employers
and co-workers could fall into stereotyped thinking to the disadvantage of minorities and women.
Stereotypes about young mothers’ ability to balance work and home obligations, stereotypes
about the ability of women to do physically challenging working, stereotypes about female
longevity and the costs of retirement plans – all of these issues came before the Court and
ultimately led it to expand the concept of sex discrimination more broadly than legislators of the
mid-1960s might have imagined.
The key stereotyping case for building a theory of protection for sexual minorities was decided
in 1989 – Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Ann Hopkins’ bid for partnership was denied because
some partners of the firm considered her inadequately feminine. They embraced a stereotype
about how a woman partner was supposed to look and behave. Hopkins, with her loud and
abrasive manner and appearance, failed to conform to that stereotype. Communicating the firm’s
decision to pass over her partnership application, the head of her office told her she could
improve her chances for the next round by dressing more femininely, walking more femininely,
toning down her speech, wearing make-up and jewelry, having her hair styled. Her substantial
contributions to the firm and her leadership in generating new business counted for little, when
decision-makers decided she was inadequately feminine to meet their expectations. In an
opinion by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the Court accepted Hopkins’ argument that allowing
such considerations to affect the partnership decision could be evidence of a prohibited
discriminatory motivation under Title VII. The Court’s opinion embraced the idea that
discrimination because of “gender,” not just discrimination because of biological sex, came
within the scope of Title VII’s prohibition. The statutory policy included wiping away gender
stereotypes that created barriers to equal opportunity for women in the workplace.
Although Ann Hopkins was not a lesbian and nothing was said about homosexuality in her case,
the implications of the ruling became obvious over time as federal courts dealt with a variety of
stereotyping claims. A person who suffered discrimination because she did not appear or act the
way people expected a woman to appear or act was protected, and that sounded to lots of people
like a description of discrimination against transgender people and some – but perhaps not all –
lesbians, gay men and bisexuals. The argument seemed particularly strong when an employer
discriminated against a person who was hired appearing and acting as a man and then began to
transition to living life as a woman.
At the same time, legal academics had begun to publish theoretical arguments supporting the
idea that discrimination against gay people was a form of sex discrimination. Among the earliest
were Professor Sylvia Law of New York University, whose 1988 article in the Wisconsin Law
Review, titled “Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender,” suggested that anti-gay
3

discrimination was about “preserving traditional concepts of masculinity and femininity. Law’s
pioneering work was quickly followed by the first of many articles by Andrew Koppelman, first
in a student note he published in the Yale Law Journal in 1988 titled “The Miscegenation
Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination,” later in his 1994 article in the New York
University Law Review titled “Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex
Discrimination.” Both Koppelman, now a professor at Northwestern University, and Law
proposed theoretical arguments for treating anti-gay discrimination as sex discrimination.
Seizing upon the Price Waterhouse precedent, transgender people and gay people began to
succeed in court during the 1990s by arguing that their failure to conform to gender stereotypes
was the reason they were denied hiring or continued employment, desirable assignments or
promotions. A strange dynamic began to grow in the courts, as judges repeated, over and over
again, that Title VII did not prohibit discrimination because of sexual orientation or gender
identity, as such, but that it did prohibit discrimination against a person because of his or her
failure to conform to gender stereotypes and expectations, regardless of the plaintiff’s sexual
orientation. Many of the courts insisted, however, that there was one gender stereotype that
could not be the basis of a Title VII claim – that men should be attracted only to women, and
women should be attracted only to men. To allow a plaintiff to assert such a claim would
dissolve the line that courts were trying to preserve between sex stereotyping claims and sexual
orientation or gender identity discrimination claims. Decades of past precedents stood in the
way of acknowledging the unworkability of that line.
Ten years after the Price Waterhouse decision, the Supreme Court decided another sex
discrimination case, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, with an opinion by Justice Antonin
Scalia that helped to fuel the broadening interpretation of Title VII. The 5th Circuit Court of
Appeals had ruled that a man who is subjected to workplace harassment of a sexual nature by
other men could not bring a hostile environment sex discrimination claim under Title VII. The
court of appeals reasoned that Congress intended in 1964 to prohibit discrimination against
women because they were women or men because they were men, and that such a limited intent
could not encompass claims of same-sex harassment, which would be beyond the expectations of
the legislators who passed that law. In reversing this ruling, Justice Scalia, who was generally
skeptical about the use of legislative history to interpret statutes, wrote for the Court that the
interpretation of Title VII was not restricted to the intentions of the 1964 Congress. While
conceding that same-sex harassment was not one of the “evils” that Congress intended to attack
by passing Title VII, he wrote:
“Statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable
evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of
our legislators by which we are governed. Title VII prohibits discrimination because of
sex in employment. This must extend to sex-based discrimination of any kind that meets
the statutory requirements.”
Thus, as our collective, societal understanding of sex, gender, sexuality, identity and orientation
broadens, our concept of sex discrimination as prohibited by Title VII also broadens. With the
combined force of Price Waterhouse and Oncale, some federal courts began to push the
boundaries even further during the first decade of the 21st century.
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By the time the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ruled in 2012 in Macy v. Holder, a
federal sector sex discrimination case, that a transgender plaintiff could pursue a Title VII claim
against a division of the Justice Department, its opinion could cite a multitude of federal court
decisions in support of that conclusion, including two Title VII decisions by the 6th Circuit Court
of Appeals involving public safety workers who were transitioning, and a 2011 ruling by the 11th
Circuit Court of Appeals that a Georgia state agency’s discrimination against an employee
because she was transitioning violated the Equal Protection Clause as sex discrimination. There
were also federal appellate rulings to similar effect under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and
the Violence against Women Act, as well as numerous trial court rulings under Title VII. So the
EEOC was following the trend, not necessarily leading the parade, when it found that
discrimination against a person because of their gender identity was a form of sex discrimination.
After the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Lawrence v. Texas in 2003, striking down a state
sodomy law under the 14th Amendment, and further rulings in 2013 and 2015 in the Windsor and
Obergefell cases, leading to a national right to marry for same-sex couples, the persistence by
many courts in asserting that Title VII did not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination
appeared increasingly archaic. Just weeks after the Obergefell decision, the EEOC issued
another landmark ruling in July 2015, David Baldwin v. Anthony Foxx, reversing half a century
of EEOC precedent and holding that sexual orientation discrimination claims were “necessarily”
sex discrimination claims covered by Title VII. The Commission ruled that a gay air traffic
controller could bring a Title VII claim against the Department of Transportation, challenging its
refusal to hire him for a full-time position at the Miami air traffic control center because of his
sexual orientation.
Building on the Price Waterhouse, Oncale and Macy decisions, the EEOC embraced several
alternative theories to support this ruling. One was the now well-established proposition that an
employer may not rely on “sex-based considerations” or “take gender into account” when
making employment decisions, unless sex was a bona fide occupational qualification – a narrow
statutory exception that is rarely relevant to a sexual orientation or gender identity case.
“Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is premised on sex-based preferences,
assumptions, expectations, stereotypes, or norms,” wrote the EEOC. “Sexual orientation as a
concept cannot be defined or understood without reference to sex. Sexual orientation is
inseparable from and inescapably linked to sex and, therefore, allegations of sexual orientation
discrimination involve sex-based considerations.” By the summer of 2015, the agency was able
to cite several federal trial court decisions applying these concepts in particular cases.
Another theory was based on the associational discrimination theory. Courts had increasingly
accepted the argument that discrimination against a person because he or she was in an
interracial relationship was discrimination because of race. The analogy was irresistible:
Discriminating against somebody because they are in a same-sex relationship must be sex
discrimination, because it involved taking the employee’s sex into account. Denying a job
because a man is partnered with a man rather than with a woman means that his sex, as well as
his partner’s sex, was taken into account by the employer in making the decision.
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Finally, the Commission embraced the stereotyping theory that some courts had refused to fully
embrace: that sexual orientation discrimination is sex discrimination because it necessarily
involves discrimination based on gender stereotypes, not just those involving appearance,
mannerisms, grooming, or speech, but also stereotypes about appropriate sexual attractions.
Quoting a Massachusetts federal trial court ruling, the agency wrote, “Sexual orientation
discrimination and harassment are often, if not always, motivated by a desire to enforce
heterosexually defined gender norms. . . The harasser may discriminate against an openly gay
co-worker, or a co-worker that he perceives to be gay, whether effeminate or not, because he
thinks, ‘real’ men should date women, and not other men.” Professor Law’s theoretical
proposition of 1988 was now surfacing in court and agency rulings a quarter century later.
The EEOC also rejected the view that adopting this expanded definition of sex discrimination
required new congressional action, pointing out that the courts had been expanding the definition
of sex discrimination under Title VII continually since the 1970s, with minimal intervention or
assistance from Congress.
Since 2015 the issue of sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII has risen to the level of
the circuit courts of appeals. In most of the circuits, there are precedents dating back decades
holding that sexual orientation claims may not be litigated under Title VII. These precedents are
softened in some circuits that have accept discrimination claims from gay men or lesbians who
plausibly asserted that their visible departure from gender stereotypes provoked discrimination
against them. But many of these appeals courts have strained to draw a line between the former
and the latter, and have rejected stereotyping claims where they perceived them as attempts to
“bootstrap” a sexual orientation claim into Title VII territory.
Ironically, one judge who emphatically rejected such a case several years ago with the
bootstrapping objection, Richard Posner of the 7th Circuit, is the author of a concurring opinion
in this new round of circuit court rulings in which he argues that it is legitimate for federal courts
to “update” statutes without waiting for Congress in order to bring them into line with current
social trends. This was part of the 7th Circuit’s en banc ruling in Kimberly Hively v. Ivy Tech
Community College, the April 4, 2017, decision that is the first by a federal appeals court to
embrace all aspects of the EEOC’s Baldwin decision and hold that a lesbian could pursue a
sexual orientation claim under Title VII. Posner’s argument echoes one made decades ago by
Guido Calabresi, then a professor at Yale, now a judge on the 2nd Circuit, in a series of lectures
published as a book titled “A Common Law for the Age of Statutes,” in which he argued that
legislative inertia would justify courts in updating old statutes to meet contemporary needs.
Although Posner did not cite Calabresi’s book, his argument is much the same. He quoted both
Justice Scalia’s statement from Oncale and an earlier iteration of similar sentiments in an opinion
by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes from 1920, in which Holmes wrote: “The case before us must
be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a
hundred years ago.”
The federal circuit courts follow the rule that when a three-judge panel of the circuit interprets a
statute, it creates a binding circuit precedent which can be reversed only by the full bench of the
court in an en banc ruling, or by the Supreme Court, or by Congress changing the statute. The
Hively ruling reversed a three-judge panel decision that had rejected the plaintiff’s Title VII
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claim based on prior circuit precedents. The vote was 8-3. Incidentally, 5 of the judges in the 8member majority were appointees of Republican presidents. The employer in that case quickly
announced that it would not seek Supreme Court review, but this ruling creates a split among the
circuit courts, so it is only a matter of time before the Supreme Court receives a petition asking
for a definitive interpretation of Title VII on this question.
The 7th Circuit opinion by Chief Judge Diane Wood accepted all of the EEOC’s theories from
the Baldwin decision. Judge Wood concluded that “it would require considerable calisthenics to
remove the ‘sex’ from ‘sexual orientation.’” “We hold that a person who alleges that she
experienced employment discrimination on the basis of her sexual orientation has put forth a
case of sex discrimination for Title VII purposes.”
Dissenting Judge Diane Sykes criticized the majority for deploying “a judge-empowering,
common-law decision method that leaves a great deal of room for judicial discretion.” Here the
battle is joined. For the majority, it is appropriate to trace the development of case law over
decades, treating the concept of sex discrimination as evolving. For Judge Posner, concurring, it
is legitimate for the court to set aside the pretense of ordinary interpretation and to “update” an
old statute to reflect contemporary understandings. And for Judge Sykes, these are both
illegitimate because it violates the division of authority between the legislature and the courts to
adopt an “interpretation” that would be outside the understanding of the legislators who enacted
the statute.
Now the scenario is playing out in other circuits. In recent weeks, the Atlanta-based 11th Circuit
and the New York-based 2nd Circuit have issued panel rulings refusing to allow sexual
orientation discrimination claims under Title VII. The panels did not consider the issue afresh
and decided to reaffirm the old rulings on the merits, but rather asserted that they were powerless
to do so because of the existing circuit precedents. In both of the cases decided in March, Evans
v. Georgia Regional Hospital and Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, the panels sent the cases
back to the trial court to see whether they could be litigated as sex stereotyping cases instead of
sexual orientation cases. But one judge dissented in the 11th Circuit, arguing that an old prePrice Waterhouse precedent should not longer be treated as binding. The 2nd Circuit panel
rejected the trial judge’s conclusion that because the gay plaintiff’s complaint included evidence
that his treatment was tainted by homophobia he could not assert a sex stereotyping claim, and
two members of the panel wrote a concurring opinion virtually accepting the EEOC’s view of
the matter and suggesting that the circuit should reconsider the issue en banc.. In both cases, the
panels took the position that sex stereotyping claims could be evaluated without reference to the
sexual orientation of the plaintiff. And, in both of these cases, lawyers for the plaintiffs are
asking the circuits to convene en banc benches to reconsider the issue, as a preliminary to
seeking possible review in the Supreme Court. A different 2nd Circuit panel has also issued a
ruling where sex stereotyping of the sort that is actionable in the 2nd Circuit is not part of the
case, and counsel in that case is also filing a petition for en banc review.
One or more of these petitions is likely to be granted. While we may see more en banc rulings in
favor of allowing sexual orientation discrimination claims, at some point a new circuit split may
develop, leading inevitably to the Supreme Court. Or the issue could get to the Supreme Court
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by an employer seeking further review, since older rulings in other circuits still present the kind
of circuit splits that the Supreme Court tries to resolve.
That leads to the highly speculative game of handicapping potential Supreme Court rulings. Neil
Gorsuch’s confirmation restores the ideological balance that existed before Justice Scalia’s
death. The Court as then constituted decided the historic same-sex marriage cases, Windsor and
Obergefell, with Justice Kennedy, a Republican appointee, writing for the Court in both cases, as
well as in earlier gay rights victories, Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas. These opinions
suggest a degree of empathy for gay litigants that might lead Kennedy to embrace an expansive
interpretation of Title VII. He is part of a generation of appellate judges appointed by Ronald
Reagan during the 1980s who made up half of the majority in the recent 7th Circuit ruling:
Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook, Joel Flaum, and Kenneth Ripple. Another member of that
majority, Ilana Rovner, was appointed by Reagan’s successor, George H.W. Bush. This line-up
underlies optimism that Kennedy might join with the Clinton and Obama appointees on the
Supreme Court to produce a five-judge majority to embrace the EEOC’s interpretation. Such
optimism may also draw on Kennedy’s decisive rejection of the argument that legal rules are
frozen at the time of their adoption and not susceptible to new interpretations in response to
evolving social understandings. This was the underlying theme of his opinions in the four major
gay rights decisions.
Since the 1970s supporters of gay rights have introduced bills in Congress to amend the federal
civil rights laws to provide explicit protection for LGBT people. None of those attempts has
succeeded to date. If the judicial battle reaches a happy conclusion, those efforts might be
rendered unnecessary, although there is always a danger in statutory law of Congress overruling
through amendment, but that seems unlikely unless the Republicans attain a filibuster-proof
majority in the Senate.
On that optimistic note, I conclude with thanks for your attention, and I am happy to answer
questions now.
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